Bernard Williams in his “Internal and External reasons” argues for internalism about reasons. He holds that according to internalism of reasons, agent A has reason to Φ if and only if he has a desire ψ which will be satisfied by Φ-ing and he also believes that it is so. Williams maintains that if one does not have a preceding desire and cannot form any desires through deliberation then it will be rational to claim that he does not have reason to Φ. Clearly desires play a crucial role here because if an agent does not have such desires, then he does not have reasons for action. Williams goes beyond this claim and says only internal reasons are reasons for action. In this article, we argue against his claim. After explaining descriptive and normative senses of rationality and alternative views regarding the rationality of beliefs and desires, in virtue of the idea of blameworthiness, responsibility, and having practical reason, we show that there are a set of actions for which moral agents are blameworthy and they, therefore, have reasons at least for certain actions which are not dependent upon their desires. This idea would be supported by the facts that most people consider a person who violates hedonic, prudential, and moral norms as much as possible to be irrational, that they consider the act of counting him as rational to be counterintuitive, and finally that societies have founded institutions for restraining such a person.Our argument from blameworthiness can be formulated as follows:(1) If a moral agent performs an action X for which he can justly be blamed, then he will be responsible and he ought not to perform X (the concept of blameworthiness entails responsibility).(2) If a moral agent is responsible and he ought not to perform X, then there is a reason for him not to perform X (responsibility entails having reason).(3) There are a set of actions, S, that moral agents can be justly blamed for performing.(4) So moral agents are responsible for performing an action in S (from 1 and 3).(5) So there are reasons for moral agents not to perform an action in S (from 2 and 4).By falsifying the negation of premise (3), we show that (3) is true. To falsify that it is not the case that there are actions for which moral agents can be justly blamed, we presented an example of an extremely immoral, imprudent, and pain-seeking agent who forms abnormal desires and acts against moral, prudent, and hedonic norms as much as possible. Since there are not any desires for such norms in his psychology, and his actions are based on these desires, he is not regarded as rational by most people and social institutions such as psychiatric clinics and courts. In addition, it would be irrational to hold that he is rational in his having immoral, imprudent, and pain-seeking desires and acting accordingly because it is a rational, prevalent, conventional practice to believe so and any theory which denies its rationality should provide convincing reasons.

Tafkik School is one of viewpoints that's been established to explain the divine-Islamic epistemes and the ways to acquire them. Mirza Mehdi Isfahani and his pupil Sheikh Mahmoud Halaby are the founders. Is this case the question is what is the speculation and rationality means and what is the relation between rationality and understanding of Islam. They do believe that rationality is the main concealment to acquire the depth of Islamic thoughts and epistemes. so they stood against every rational approaches. In their thoughts using the argument and being rational is the main thing that make them miss understand. Therefore they are claiming that even all self-evident ideas are darkness and Islamic cognition through this approach is a wrong path and make people go astray. Establishment an argument to achieve the true-Islamic Idea make Islam demolish and it is against the righteousness. In this article we are going to represent the ration and argument place and how to achieve true-Islamic Ideas.

One of the most important arguments for the existence of god is the cosmological argument. Traditional developments of cosmological argument, which are based on the casual principle and principle of sufficient reason, have always faced many challenges. Hence, this argument has been constantly evolving throughout its history. "a new cosmological argument" is one of the contemporary versions of this argument, which is formulated to get rid of these challenges. This version attempts to provide a different and logical version of the cosmological argument, and this do by using the theories of possible worlds, modal notions and the theory of weak version of principle of sufficient reason. According to this new version of the cosmological argument, the necessity of God's existence for the universe is proved without the need for the strong version of principle of sufficient reason and without the need to prove the casual principle. Consequently, many of the traditional criticisms will be no objection to this argument. In this article, we will first explain the technical terms of this argument, then describe its formulation, and in the end we will discuss some of the most important critiques of this argument.

One may say that The Open Society and Its Enemies (OS) offered in 1945 the first complete elaboration of the general approach proposed by Karl Popper, namely his ‘critical rationalism’, a bold generalization of the fallibilist falsificationism in the domain of the empirical sciences masterly proposed in Logik der Forschung (1934). The political content of The OS has been critically discussed. Nevertheless, not all people insist on the equally important moral dimension of the book, giving it its unity, I submit. Without morality, no critical discussion, no reason, no open society, let us say in a nutshell. I would argue that according to Popper, a strictly Christian morality of love would not be the appropriate emotional companion of critical rationalism, but that the less demanding moral emotion of sympathy or compassion is perhaps necessary to give it its force against violence. I give some support to this line of argument. In my view, Popper proposed a somewhat unarticulated critical rationalist ‘emotivism’ of sorts. The emotion of compassion is necessary for triggering our moral decisions and values, which are the ultimate basis of the choice for a reason against violence.

Cosmological argument is a general name that includes many different arguments, but all of its versions are a posteriori (contrary to ontological argument) and based on an apparently common feature of our experience (contrary to argument from design). I try to explain the structure of the cosmological argument via explaining some of its important versions. In this regard, Aquinas versions of cosmological argument; the arguments from motion, causation and contingency (the first three ways of his famous five ways) are discussed in details. Then I proceed to discuss Kalam cosmological argument, which is rooted in Islamic theological writings in cosmological argument, which is rooted in Islamic theological writings in the Middle Ages, and the argument from the principle of sufficient reason, respectively. Criticizing all of these versions, I conclude my paper by explaining and defending Avicenna"s version of cosmological argument.

The argument from illusion and the argument from hallucination refute the directness of visual perceptual experience. Although the first argument includes at least two disputable premises (the phenomenal principle and the common kind assumption), the second one just includes the common kind assumption. I will illustrate that the arguments, not only have different premises, but concern different subjects. The argument from illusion concerns the object of visual perceptual experience, but the argument from hallucination concerns the nature of the experience. On the basis of this consideration, I will propose the two different senses of directness. According to the first sense, an experience is direct, if it is directed to the world itself. But according to the second sense, an experience is direct, if the world itself, notably not its representation, constitutes the experience.

In 1970, Gödel showed his ontological argument to Dana Scott and discussed it with him. Afterwards, Scott presented a slightly different version of the argument at Princeton University. The logical system of the argument is a second-order quantified S5-modal logic with identity and an abstraction operator. Granted the acceptability of the underlying logical system, Godels conclusion that necessarily there exists a God-like being) can be derived from the premises-with Godel and Scott on the scene, who can say otherwise? Sobel, however, proved that the system faces modal collapse-i.e. P↔ðP is derivable from the system. Responding to Sobel, Anderson tried to block this by weakening some axioms and definitions.In this paper, I will be trying to consider Godels ontological argument (Scotts version) from a logical point of view, along with Sobels criticism and Andersons emendations.

Modernity theories occupy a vast scope in the literature, representing philosophical, historical-civil, sociological-historical approaches, and sociology of religion. Various analytical methods and theories with specific titles and characteristics have been developed within any of these approaches. The present research started with the assumption that all these approaches in this wide-ranging spectrum revolve around action and reaction concepts on one hand, and self-founded and communicative reason on the other. By using this framework, the above-mentioned notions can be conceptualized and differentiated as the main focus of this study. Our research hypothesis states that modernity theories began with the self-founded and autonomic action and then were extended to communicative reason and interaction. It follows that, the theorists’ who attempted to explain the essence of modernity moved from philosophy to sociology in form of a process by which the society was rationalized while conceptualizing reason made a passage through transcendental to instrumental and then to communicative reason. The focus of this research is on the exploration of this path by the use of a historical-hermeneutical approach.

Is there any domain beyond reason that is paradoxical and the oppositeof reason?This question always makes mysticism face philosophy. Therefore the two domains of reason and beyond reason and the relation between them have been always attended to by the Gnostics and students of gnosis and religion in both the Christian West and Islamic East. W.T. Stace maintained that the judgments of the domain of reason are paradoxical, interpreting a phrase of Meister Eckhart.Mulla Sadra has offered an interesting thesis in this field interpreting Aynolgozat and Ghazalis words. This thesis reveals minute details that have been ignored. In this paper we have used comparative method to show the depth of his view.